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INTRODUCTION 
Even in a discipline where ambiguity is cherished, law professors 
are stumped when it comes to understanding the content of legal 
education’s motto: “Teach them to think like a lawyer.” For decades, 
scholars have groaned under the weight of trying to describe what 
“thinking like a lawyer” means.1 A recently popular educational 
psychology construct may hold the answer: metacognition, or the 
process of thinking about one’s thinking. Education theorists have 
been much more successful in defining, explaining, and testing for 
metacognition, than law professors have been in explaining 
“thinking like a lawyer.” 
This Article explains metacognitive skills in the context of law, 
reviews the limited legal scholarship that references metacognitive 
skills, and presents the first empirical study of the metacognitive skills 
of newly admitted, highly qualified law students. The data 
demonstrates that top law students—hardworking, overachieving 
college graduates with high IQs—do not have well-developed 
metacognitive skills. This Article then explores why metacognitive 
skills are so helpful in performing the tasks required in the practice of 
law and suggests that life-long, expert thinkers rely on developed 
metacognitive skills. Unfortunately for many law students who do 
not understand the purposes behind law professors’ pedagogical 
techniques, Socratic Method sometimes leaves students believing 
that thinking like a lawyer means avoiding straight answers and 
promoting ambiguity. In light of this struggle, how can legal 
 
 1. Notwithstanding the persistent use of “thinking like a lawyer,” the various 
definitions are both inconsistent and impossibly vague. To some, “thinking like a lawyer” has 
only to do with analysis and a way of thinking. See, e.g., Peter Toll Hoffman, Teaching Theory 
Versus Practice: Are We Training Lawyers or Plumbers?, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 625, 628 
(footnotes omitted) (“The concept of thinking like a lawyer is ill-defined in the literature, and 
subject to debate, but it usually means a particular method of thinking or analysis for 
understanding law.”); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The 
Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1251 n.85 
(1991) (“The phrase ‘to think like a lawyer’ today means, more or less, to be capable of 
independent thought, a highly prized attribute in today’s hierarchical, technocratic society.”). 
To others, it is more than that, but also includes knowing and applying skills that are needed to 
be a good lawyer. See, e.g., David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods of American Legal 
Education, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 20 (2011) (“I have never thought that the real meaning of 
‘thinking like a lawyer’ represents a passive state of mind, but one involving the ability to 
actually function effectively as a lawyer in a dynamic and risky environment.”). 
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educators convey what it means to “think like a lawyer”? Superb 
metacognitive skills go a long way toward this goal.  
Studies in education have demonstrated that highly developed 
metacognitive skills help in converting a student into a life-long 
learner—one whose education and learning do not stop when he 
or she leaves school. Metacognitive skills improve oral 
communication, written communication, and comprehension of 
texts. In addition, metacognitive skills increase the speed and 
accuracy of factual analysis and, because of the increased 
confidence in performing these tasks, those with better 
metacognitive skills suffer from less anxiety about performing 
challenging intellectual tasks. 
Legal education is in the throes of a painful revolution where 
it has been charged to abandon the accepted methods of a 
century—whether Socratic Method or merely the Langdellian 
Method—and remake itself.2 Moreover, this metamorphosis is to 
take place in an economy where law school budgets are 
increasingly stingy and alumni without jobs are not in a position 
to become donors. The MacCrate Report, the Carnegie Report, 
and a plethora of other scholarship have pushed legal education 
from a largely cognitive endeavor to a balance with skills training.3 
We argue that the one fundamental skill being overlooked in this 
transmutation is metacognition. If metacognition is highly 
relevant to legal thinking and the demands of the profession, as 
we assert in Part III, and if it can be taught, as we assert in Part 
IV, then the critical question is whether law students are likely to 
have already learned these lessons before graduate study or 
whether they need to learn them in law school. 
 
 2. Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 
114 (1999) (“In the place of the traditional approach is an eclectic mixture of newer 
approaches, including toned-down Socratic questioning, student panels, group discussions, 
and lectures.”). 
 3. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 21–46, 87–126 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; ABA SECTION 
OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter 
MACCRATE REPORT]; See also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 643–45 (arguing that practical 
training is just as important as “thinking like a lawyer,” but that this is not widely accepted in 
law schools); Barnhizer, supra note 1, at 66–74 (including practical skills training as part of a 
proposed curriculum plan for law schools). 
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Our study, reported in Part II, illustrates that, when they are 
promoting “skills training,” law schools should adopt teaching 
methods that directly teach metacognitive skills. Of special 
interest in the dialogue about legal education reform is the fact 
that metacognitive skills are taught in the use of pure Socratic 
Method, although more awareness of the concept of 
metacognition would vastly assist in the process. Though Socrates 
didn’t use the term, encouraging metacognitive thought was an 
important component of his teaching approach centuries ago.4 
This Article is not the place to undertake a thorough defense of 
the highly contested issue of Socratic Method or other approaches 
to teaching metacognition; however, metacognition undoubtedly 
will become a major component in any successful law school 
reform and, with it, a reassessment of Socratic Method.5 
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of the concept 
of metacognition and its role in enhancing thinking. We 
distinguish related but separate concepts and review the most 
 
 4. See, e.g., Barry Ritholtz, How’s Your MetaCognition?, RITHOLTZ.COM (Aug. 16, 
2013, 8:45 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/08/hows-your-metacognition 
(“Socrates perhaps most famously declared ‘I only know that I know nothing;’ He was perhaps 
the first human to wax eloquent on metacognition. It may be counter-intuitive, but 
understanding one’s own ignorance is the first step to attaining knowledge.”); David Denton, 
Reflection and Learning: Characteristics, Obstacles, and Implications, 43 EDUCATION 
PHILOSOPHY & THEORY 838, 842 (citation omitted) (“Socrates integrated metacognitive 
thinking as well. For instance, Socrates recommends examining one’s thoughts and identifying 
gaps in one’s arguments.”). Although a number of components of Socratic Method can be tied 
to metacognitive skills, the most apparent is the metacognitive skill of recognizing what the 
thinker already knows and what will need to be learned new. An expert thinker does not 
reinvent the wheel but transfers knowledge of information and skill previously acquired to the 
task at hand and then identifies what additional knowledge is required. The correlation 
between this step and Socrates’ humility can be described as follows: 
If what we believe so confidently could well be wrong, then the appropriate attitude 
ought to be humility about what we think we know. Humility is just what the 
philosopher Socrates wanted from his students in ancient Greece. . . . The Socratic 
Method involves teaching by asking a series of questions. By posing questions to 
young philosophers, Socrates was able to evoke what they knew about a topic . . . . 
Inevitably, the dialogues resulted in much greater clarity about what was known and 
what was unknown. 
MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, LEARNING AND COGNITION: THE DESIGN OF THE MIND 133 
(2010) (citing DONALD PALMER, LOOKING AT PHILOSOPHY: THE UNBEARABLE HEAVINESS 
OF PHILOSOPHY MADE LIGHTER (3rd ed. 2001). 
 5. For a brief discussion of the relationship of Socratic Method and metacognition, and 
the possibility that the MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, recognized skills that are 
metacognitive but did not so label them, see the text accompanying notes 96–97 infra. 
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recent education literature on the subject. In Part II, this Article 
reports the empirical results of our study, which illustrate that the 
metacognitive skills of many, and probably most, entering law 
students are weak. In Part III, this Article describes how 
metacognitive skills are critical to the kinds of activities law 
students and lawyers perform. It then reviews in Part IV extant 
legal literature on metacognition and the need for more 
consistent and rigorous work in this area, as well as current efforts 
to teach metacognition in some schools. The Article then 
concludes in Part V with suggestions for further research. 
I. METACOGNITION AND THE STUDY OF THINKING 
Metacognition is a construct that was first articulated by John 
Flavell,6 who later defined it as “cognition about cognitive 
phenomena[.]”7 Metacognition, so named and defined, has only 
recently become a focus of cognitive-developmental inquiry.8 Often 
described informally as “thinking about thinking,”9 metacognition is 
the concept that individuals can monitor and regulate their own 
cognitive processes and thereby improve the quality and effectiveness 
of their thinking. Teaching metacognitive skills to thinkers is similar 
 
 6. John H. Flavell, Metacognitive Aspects of Problem Solving, in THE NATURE OF 
INTELLIGENCE 231, 232 (Lauren B. Resnick ed., 1976). Flavell provided illustrative examples 
of the thinking about thinking involved in metacognition: 
[I]f I notice that I am having more trouble learning A than B; if it strikes me that I 
should double-check C before accepting it as a fact; if it occurs to me that I had 
better scrutinize each and every alternative in any multiple-choice type task situation 
before deciding which is the best one; if I become aware that I am not sure what the 
experimenter really wants me to do; if I sense that I had better make a note of D 
because I may forget it; if I think to ask someone about E to see if I have it right. 
Id. 
 7. John H. Flavell, Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring: A New Area of Cognitive-
Developmental Inquiry, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 906, 906 (Oct. 1979). 
 8. While searching Google Scholar citations for Flavell’s 1979 article, we found 269 
citations for the ten-year period from 1979 to 1989 and 3060 citations for the ten-year period 
from 2002 to 2012. 
 9. See, e.g., EMILY R. LAI, METACOGNITION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 4 (2011), 
available at http://www.pearsonassessments.com/lai/images/tmrs/Metacognition 
_Literature_Review_Final.pdf; Savia A. Coutinho, The Relationship Between Goals, 
Metacognition, and Academic Success, 7 EDUCATE 39, 40 (2007);.Sevgi Turan, Özcan Demirel 
& Iskender Sayek, Metacognitive Awareness and Self-Regulated Learning Skills of Medical 
Students in Different Medical Curricula, 31 MED. TCHR. 477, 477 (2009) (defining 
metacognition also as “cognition about cognition”). 
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to what coaches and athletic psychologists try to teach athletes. They 
bring to the forefront the awareness of how to maximize, and 
consistently tap into, all the talent and genius possessed by the 
player, both inherently and by the process of practice. It is the 
awareness and then strategic adjustment that pushes someone with 
flashes of brilliance into a consistently brilliant thinker who can learn, 
absorb, and apply new material with increasing ease. 
Metacognition requires having both awareness of the process and 
the ability to control learning and thinking.10 The two components 
are identified as knowledge11 and regulation.12 It appears that 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation develop 
independently of each other.13 By the time students reach adulthood, 
most have fairly well-developed metacognitive knowledge.14 In 
contrast, metacognitive regulation, which involves “the monitoring 
of one’s cognition and includes planning activities, awareness of 
comprehension and task performance, and evaluation of the efficacy 
of monitoring processes and strategies,” is frequently 
underdeveloped.15 
Understanding metacognition requires distinguishing it from 
other concepts. Metacognition is different from mindfulness, though 
 
 10. Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal 
Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 35 (2006) [hereinafter Niedwiecki, Lawyers]. 
 11. For a definition of metacognitive knowledge, see LAI, supra note 9, at 2 
(“[K]nowledge about oneself as a learner and the factors that might impact performance, 
knowledge about strategies, and knowledge about when and why to use strategies.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Gregory Schraw, The Effect of Knowledge on Local and Global Monitoring, 19 
CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 143, 143 (1994). 
 14. In one study, researchers found a significant difference between graduates and 
undergraduates in metacognitive regulation, but not metacognitive knowledge. Andria Young & 
Jane D. Fry, Metacognitive Awareness and Academic Achievement in College Students, 8 J. SCHOL. 
TEACHING & LEARNING 1, 7–8 (2008). A more recent study found no significant difference 
between undergraduate and graduate students in business in either knowledge or regulation, but 
graduate students in teacher education demonstrated a measureable difference in metacognitive 
regulation when compared to undergraduates. Louise R. Moulding, Penée W. Stewart & Susan S. 
Cooper, Metacognitive Development in Undergraduate and Graduate Students in Teacher 
Education and Business Administration, 14 J. INT’L SOC. TCHR. EDUC. 49 (2010). 
 15. LAI, supra note 9, at 2. Metacognitive regulation is comprised of three separate 
skills: planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Planning is “the selection of appropriate 
strategies and the allocation of resources that affect performance”; monitoring is “awareness 
of comprehension and task performance”; and evaluation “refers to appraising the products 
and efficiency of one’s learning.” Gregory Schraw, Promoting General Metacognitive 
Awareness, 26 INSTRU. SCI. 113, 115 (1998). 
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
1053 Teaching “Thinking Like a Lawyer” 
 1059 
they are related concepts.16 Mindfulness “generally refers to a 
deliberate, present-moment, non-judgmental awareness of whatever 
passes through the five conventional senses and the mind: emotions, 
thoughts, and body sensations.”17 Mindfulness is awareness of in-
the-moment thought, while metacognition is awareness and 
regulation of the process of thinking, reasoning, and learning. The 
concepts overlap as both mindfulness and metacognition include 
awareness and, to some extent, self-regulation.18 Mindfulness is often 
associated with awareness of the substantive content of a person’s 
thinking and control of emotions while metacognition is thinking of 
the cognitive strategies and processes used while thinking. 
For example, mindfulness may be demonstrated when a student 
is writing a journal entry or a reflection paper for a law class on what 
new information has been learned.19 Metacognitive work could also 
employ a journal, but the point would be for the student to reflect 
on and record how the student learned, rather than what the student 
learned.20 Metacognition is thinking about the cognitive process or 
strategies used while thinking about, or trying to learn, the content 
and then mentally monitoring if the strategy is working well and 
how it can be subsequently improved.21 
 
 16. See, e.g., Robin C. Mörck, Are Metacognition and Mindfulness Related Concepts? 8–9 
(2009), (unpublished dissertation, Örebro University), available at http://nai.diva-
portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:275993 (discussing the relatedness of the two concepts 
and citing studies that have regarded mindfulness as an aspect of metacognition); Scott R. 
Bishop et al., Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Definition, 11 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & 
PRAC. 230, 233 (2004) (“[M]indfulness can be defined, in part, as the self-regulation of 
attention . . . . In this context, mindfulness can be considered a metacognitive skill.”); Fadal 
Zeidan et al., Mindfulness Meditation Improves Cognition: Evidence of Brief Mental Training, 
19 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 597, 598 (2010) (citation omitted) (“Mindfulness 
training cultivates moment-to-moment awareness of the self and environment. To this extent, 
mindfulness training heightens meta-cognitive processing.”). 
 17. Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and the Legal Profession: An Introduction to the 
Mindful Lawyer Symposium, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 634, 635 (2012). See also Leonard L. Riskin, 
The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law 
Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23, 48 (2002) (“In 
mindfulness meditation, a person seeks . . . to notice . . . whatever passes through her 
awareness. . . .”) [hereinafter Riskin, Contemplative]. 
 18. See, e.g., Riskin, Contemplative, supra note 17 (“[M]indfulness meditation can help 
develop . . . self-awareness [and] self-regulation.”). 
 19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 20. Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra note 10 (defining metacognition as the “awareness and 
control over one’s learning and thinking”). 
 21. Id. 
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Intelligence and metacognition are also related, but different, 
constructs. Intelligence is “the ability to learn or understand or to 
deal with new or trying situations” and “the skilled use of reason 
[or] the ability to apply knowledge to manipulate one’s environment 
or to think abstractly as measured by objective criteria.”22 In 
contrast, metacognition is “the ability to reflect upon, understand 
and control one’s learning” as a process.23 In other words, 
intelligence is the ability to learn or apply knowledge in one’s life 
while metacognition is the ability to monitor and evaluate how well 
one is doing at learning and applying that knowledge and then 
making necessary adjustments. Cesare Cornoldi maintains 
metacognition affects the use of basic intelligence in many ways.24 
For instance, metacognition is important for the execution of higher-
level thinking skills, such as analysis and synthesis, but seems to have 
little impact on low-level thinking tasks, such as recalling details of a 
case.25 Metacognition also increases the ability to use a cognitive skill 
learned in one situation in another very different setting.26 
Metacognition enhances intelligence and increases the ability to 
learn and to perform thinking tasks—it is the skill that maximizes the 
utility of intelligence.27 Thus, students with lesser intellectual ability 
who have greater metacognitive skills often demonstrate academic 
performance similar to students with higher intellectual ability.28 For 
 
 22. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/intelligence (last visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
 23. Gregory Schraw & Rayne Sperling Dennison, Assessing Metacognitive Awareness, 19 
CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 460, 460 (1994). 
 24. Cesare Cornoldi, Metacognition, Intelligence, and Academic Performance, in 
HARRIET S. WATERS & WOLFGANG SCHNEIDER, METACOGNITION, STRATEGY USE AND 
INSTRUCTION 257, 274 (2010) (“[M]etacognition appears particularly critical because it 
affects the most central aspects of basic intelligence and may directly contribute to a better 
capacity to control working memory operations. Another important reason for paying 
particular attention to the educational implications of metacognition is that usual life events 
and traditional cultural and educational efforts do not necessarily guarantee the development 
of metacognition.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law 
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 27 (2003) 
(“[W]hile teaching to diverse learning styles is helpful for students, adding metacognitive 
strategies maximizes student performance.”). 
 28. Guy Trainin & H. Lee Swanson, Cognition, Metacognition, and Achievement of 
College Students with Learning Disabilities, 28 LEARNING DISABILITY Q. 261, 262 (2005); see 
also H. Lee Swanson, Influence of Metacognitive Knowledge and Aptitude on Problem Solving, 
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instance, one study found that “intellectual ability uniquely 
accounted for 10% of variance in learning performance, 
metacognitive skillfulness uniquely accounted for 17% of variance in 
learning performance, while both predictors shared another 22% of 
variance in learning.”29 Thus, metacognitive abilities combined with 
intelligence are a greater predictor of learning performance than 
intelligence alone.30 
Metacognition supports and enhances learning, but is a separate 
skill that is not automatically developed as a result of traditional 
educational experiences or life events.31 When students are taught to 
be metacognitive, they demonstrate a higher level of intellectual 
awareness maturity32 and thus outperform peers who are not taught 
metacognition even when these peers have similar intelligence.33 No 
matter the starting point, high levels of metacognition enable 
students of all intelligence levels to be more strategic in their 
learning. Researcher John Hattie recently completed a 
comprehensive analysis of education to “develop an explanatory 
story about the key influences in student learning.”34 He found that 
metacognitive strategies had an effect size of .69, which is equivalent 
to moving from the fiftieth percentile to the seventy-fifth 
percentile.35 In other words, if a student were performing at an 
 
82 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 306, 306 (1990). 
 29. Marcel V.J. Veenman & Marleen A. Spaans, Relation Between Intellectual and 
Metacognitive Skills: Age and Task Differences, 15 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
159, 161 (2005). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Cornoldi, supra note 24. 
 32. Nancy Joseph, Metacognition Needed: Teaching Middle and High School Students to 
Develop Strategic Learning Skills, 54 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE: ALTERNATIVE EDUC. FOR 
CHILD. & YOUTH 99, 100 (2009). 
 33. Such findings are not limited to one content area, but occur across multiple school 
subjects. Annette F. Gourgey, Metacognition in Basic Skills Instruction, 26 INSTRU. SCI. 81, 86 
(1998); Bracha Kramarski, Zemira R. Mevarech & Marsel Arami, The Effects of Metacognitive 
Instruction on Solving Mathematical Authentic Tasks, 49 EDUC. STUD. MATHEMATICS 225, 
228–29 (2002); Zemira R. Mevarech & Chagit Amrany, Immediate and Delayed Effects of 
Meta-Cognitive Instruction on Regulation of Cognition and Mathematics Achievement, 3 
METACOGNITION & LEARNING 147, 147 (2008); Zemira R. Mevarech & Bracha Kramarski, 
Improve: A Multidimensional Method for Teaching Mathematics in Heterogeneous Classrooms, 34 
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 365, 386 (1997). 
 34. JOHN HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING: A SYNTHESIS OF OVER 800 META-ANALYSES 
RELATING TO ACHIEVEMENT 6 (2009). 
 35. Effect size is a measure of performance in standard deviation units, making .69 a 
substantial difference in performance. Id. at 189. 
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average level (fiftieth percentile), by using metacognitive strategies, 
he would move to the top quarter of the class. 
Another way metacognition may improve performance and 
maximize intelligence is in helping to mitigate the effects of 
anxiety.36 Students with high levels of metacognitive ability also 
display higher levels of confidence in their ability to answer problems 
correctly.37 Higher confidence can inhibit negative anxiety-related 
interruptions to mental processes.38 
Metacognition has become an extremely important concept in 
education scholarship. Most educational psychology texts now 
devote a section to metacognition and its relationship to learning, 
and a second general handbook on metacognition in education has 
recently been published.39 Metacognition and Learning, an 
international journal dedicated to the study of metacognition, 
published its first issue in 2006.40 In 2008, Educational Psychology 
Review devoted a special issue to metacognition, self-regulation, and 
self-regulated learning, summarizing what is currently known about 
the topic and highlighting areas that still need investigation.41 The 
breadth and depth of this scholarship in educational psychology and 
related disciplines demonstrates the intense interest in 
metacognition, the progress made in understanding it, and the 
importance of teaching it. 
II. A STUDY OF LAW STUDENTS’ METACOGNITIVE SKILLS 
We began this project assuming that law students, with their high 
academic credentials, would be relatively advanced in their 
metacognitive abilities. The skills needed to succeed in law school 
and as a lawyer—problem-solving, oral and reading comprehension, 
writing, etc.—are significantly enhanced by metacognition. More 
 
 36. Math students who exhibit high math anxiety but also demonstrate high levels of 
metacognition have similar test performances as students who have low levels of math anxiety. 
Angela M. Legg & Lawrence Locker Jr., Math Performance and Its Relationship to Math 
Anxiety and Metacognition, 11 N. AM. J. OF PSYCHOL. 471, 471 (2009). 
 37. Id. at 479. 
 38. Id. at 481. 
 39. HANDBOOK OF METACOGNITION IN EDUCATION (Douglas J. Hacker, John 
Dunlosky & Arthur C. Graesser eds., 2009) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
 40. Metacognition and Learning, SPRINGERLINK, 
http://link.springer.com/journal/11409 (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 41. 20(4) ED. PSYCHOL. REV. (2008). 
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importantly, high metacognitive awareness and regulation links to 
better academic performance.42 The students in our study 
demonstrated academic success, illustrated by the grades and test 
scores necessary to be admitted to the law school, and would seem 
likely to have excellent metacognitive skills. They do not. 
Fortunately, individual students whose metacognitive skills are 
lower “may benefit from metacognitive training to improve their 
metacognition and academic performance.”43 Our work sets a 
framework for additional empirical research on law student 
metacognitive skills, supports the need for more, solid scholarship in 
law and metacognition, and encourages the further development of 
programs to teach metacognitive skills in law schools. 
A. Method 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the metacognition 
of first-year law students. Can law professors assume that most 
students who obtain admission in law programs are already equipped 
with sufficient metacognitive skills? If not, teaching metacognitive 
skills should then be a priority. 
1. Participants 
Participants were 150 law students, representing approximately 
one-half of the first-year class beginning their first semester in fall 
2010 and one-half of the class beginning in fall 2013 at the J. 
Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University (“BYU”).44 
The two cohorts are appropriately combined given the statistical 
evidence of similarity and are thus analyzed as a single group.45 The 
 
 42. ROBERT J. STERNBERG, Metacognition, Abilities, and Developing Expertise: What 
Makes an Expert Student?, in METACOGNITION IN LEARNING AND INSTRUCTION: THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 247, 247 (Hope J. Hartman ed., 2001) (“The various researchers 
use a variety of theoretical frameworks, methodologies, subject-matter areas, and arguments to 
make a fully persuasive case for the importance of metacognition to school success. One could 
critique any one study or set of results, but the strength . . . is in the converging operations, all 
of which make the identical case.”). 
 43. Savia A. Coutinho, The Relationship Between Goals, Metacognition, and Academic 
Success, 7 EDUCATE, no. 1, 2007 at 40; see also Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra note 10, at 42 
(“The theory behind metacognition is that those learners who apply appropriate metacognitive 
strategies are better self-regulated and effective learners.”). 
 44. A request for participation was sent to the entire entering class, and seventy students 
from each class self-selected to participate. 
 45. The two cohorts were compared on the dependent variables in this study to ensure 
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BYU law students entering in 2010 had a median entrance GPA of 
3.75 and a median Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score of 164 
out of 180, which puts the 2010 group in the ninetieth percentile of 
all people who took the LSAT in the three years prior.46 At the top 
quarter of admitted students in 2010, or the seventy-fifth percentile, 
the LSAT score was 167 and the GPA was 3.86. The BYU law 
students entering in 2013 had a slightly higher median GPA of 3.77, 
and a slightly lower median LSAT score of 161 out of 180, which 
puts the 2013 group in the seventy-fifth percentile of all people who 
took the LSAT in the three years prior. However, the seventy-fifth 
percentile of admitted BYU students in 2013 had a 3.88 GPA, which 
was higher than those in 2010, and a median LSAT score of 164 of 
180. Thus, the students in the study fit easily in the top quarter of 
U.S. law students. 
The participants in our study also generally represent law 
students recently admitted to schools ranked in the top thirty to the 
top fifty in the nation. Although efforts to rank law schools are 
extremely problematic given how the various factors are weighed, 
such rankings may be useful in putting the students in this study in 
context. U.S. News and World Report (US News) ranked BYU as the 
forty-second best U.S. law school overall in 2010,47 and thirty-sixth 
in 2014.48 Brian Leiter’s Law School Rankings, which focuses on 
students’ LSAT scores, GPAs, and class size, ranked BYU thirty-third 
in the nation in 2010,49 but did not conduct such rankings for more 
recent years. Business Insider ranked BYU thirty-fourth in 2012.50 
 
that they were from the same population and could be combined into a single group without 
compromising the interpretation of the results. There was no significant difference in the mean 
scores for the dependent variables, providing evidence that the two cohorts are indeed from 
the same population and can be combined in further analysis. See infra note 65. 
 46. LSAT Score Conversion, ALPHASCORE, http://www.alphascore.com/resources/lsat-
score-conversion (last updated Mar. 4, 2011). 
 47. Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 2010), at 74, 74 (ranked as 42). 
 48. Schools of Law Rankings, U.S. News & World Rep. 2015 ed., at 84 (ranking BYU 
at thirty sixth), available at http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings/page+2 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 49. Ranking of Top 40 Law Schools by Student (Numerical) Quality 2010, BRIAN 
LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (June 1, 2010), http://www.leiterrankings.com/ 
students/2010_top40lawschools.shtml. In 2010, BYU Law School was ranked thirty-first in 
median LSAT score of matriculated students and fourteenth in median entrance GPA. LAW 
SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE 
TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS: 2012 EDITION 56–61 (2011). 
 50. Jennifer Polland, The 50 Best Law Schools in America, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 4, 
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Moreover, BYU ranks high in placing students in the limited and 
coveted positions as Supreme Court clerks. Over the 2003–2013 
terms, BYU students ranked thirteenth under “‘Per Capita’ Clerkship 
Placement” and seventeenth in “Total Clerkship Placement.”51 The 
Princeton Review Most Competitive Students list moved BYU students 
up from third in 2012 to second in 2013 and 2014.52 
This is the first empirical study of metacognition and law 
students ever published. Although more research using larger sample 
sizes and longitudinal studies would be useful, we can begin to 
understand the implications for legal education with these results. 
Because we understood that, independently, the data derived from 
the study would not hold much meaning for readers outside of 
education disciplines, we looked for other studies dealing with highly 
qualified postgraduate students for a basis of comparison. Most of 
the extant literature focuses on secondary and college students. 
Although medical schools have recently become interested in 
metacognition and some studies using the same survey instrument 
are underway,53 few published studies exist at this level.  
We compared the law student data with results using the same 
instrument on seventy-three volunteer master’s degree students in 
business administration and fifty-three volunteer master’s degree 
students in education at Weber State University, a nearby regional 
university. We assumed both the comparison groups would score 
lower on metacognition than the law students because of the high 
academic scores of the law students. The Weber students have lower 
academic qualifications based on objective measures.54 
 
2012, 10:17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-50-best-law-schools-in-america-
2012-9?op=1. 
 51. Supreme Court Clerkship Placement, 2003 Through 2013 Terms, BRIAN LEITER’S 
LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.leiterrankings.com/new/2013 
_SCClerkshipPlacement.shtml. 
 52. The Princeton Review: Most Competitive Students, http://www.princetonreview.com 
/SchoolList.aspx?id=729 (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 53. A surgical educator, Jack Contessa, at Yale New Haven Hospital has been 
conducting research on surgical residents using the MAI, the same instrument we used in our 
study. The data has been collected but not yet analyzed. Contessa contacted one of the authors 
of this study by email to make sure that he used the same descriptors for the MAI Likert scale 
in his study as we did in ours. Emails from Jack Contessa, Medical Educator at Yale New 
Haven Hospital, to Penée Stewart, Professor of Teacher Education, Weber State University, 
(Nov. 12, 2012, 1:25 PM MST & Sept. 3, 2013, 4:42 AM MST) (on file with authors). 
 54. The Master of Business Administration students had an average entrance GPA of 3.4 
and an average Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) score of 560 out of 800, 
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1066 
The student populations were similar in race and cultural traits, 
but two differences may be interesting. The mean age of students in 
the business administration and education programs was greater than 
the mean age of the law students, and the spread in age was wider. 
The law students were, on average, younger and closer in age. We 
include age and gender information in Table 1 in the Appendix, 
although previous studies have shown that metacognition is not 
related to gender.55 The preponderance of males in the business 
administration program and females in teacher education made it 
unreasonable to conduct analysis by gender without the influence of 
program. 
2. Instrumentation 
The survey instrument used in this study was the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory (MAI). The MAI is a self-report questionnaire 
developed by Gregory Schraw and R.S. Dennison in 1994 that is 
commonly used in metacognition studies of adults.56 Earlier studies 
have shown that the MAI is reliable.57 The MAI consists of fifty-two 
 
which is the fifty-second percentile. Email from Peggy J. Saunders, Director, Master of 
Education Program, Associate Professor, Weber State University, to Penée Stewart, Professor 
of Teacher Education, Weber State University, (Nov. 10, 2014, 5:27 PM MST) (on file with 
authors). The Weber Masters of Education students had an average entrance GPA of 3.82. 
Students applying to the program with a GPA between 3.0 and 3.24 must submit Miller’s 
Analogies Test (MAT) scores with a minimum of 400 or Graduate Record Examination (GRE) 
scores with minimum 480 each on the Verbal and Quantitative Reasoning, and 5.0 on the 
Analytical Writing portion. Because applicants who have higher than a 3.25 GPA are not 
required to submit MAT or GRE scores for the masters of education program, we do not have 
average GRE scores for this program. According to US News, Weber is sixty-eighth among the 
regional universities in the West. Weber State University, U.S. NEWS, 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/weber-state-university-
3680/rankings (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
 55. See, e.g., Elaine M. Justice & Teresa M. Dornan, Metacognitive Differences Between 
Traditional-Age and Nontraditional-Age College Students, 51 ADULT EDUC. Q. 236, 246 
(2001). 
 56. Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 460–75. While most metacognitive 
instruments have been designed for use with children and adolescents, the MAI was designed 
specifically for use with adults. This self-report instrument continues to be used in studies of 
adult metacognition. See, e.g., Mörck, supra note 16, at 11; Rayne A. Sperling et al., 
Metacognition and Self-Regulated Learning Constructs, 10 EDUC. RES. & EVALUATION 117, 
123–35 (2004); Turan et al., supra note 9, at 477–78; Young & Fry, supra note 14, at 1–10. 
 57. Schraw and Dennison reported that Cronbach’s α coefficient for the entire 
instrument was 0.95 in their first study, Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 464, and 0.93 
in their second study. Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 468. Cronbach’s α for the two 
subscales were 0.91 in their first, and 0.88 in their second, study. Id. Sperling, et al. also found 
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statements to which participants respond by marking on a five-point 
Likert scale, with zero indicating “never” and five indicating 
“always.”58 The MAI statements represent the two components of 
metacognition: knowledge and regulation.59 Within the knowledge 
component are statements of declarative knowledge (knowledge 
about self and strategies), procedural knowledge (knowledge about 
strategy use), and conditional knowledge (knowledge about when 
and why to use strategies).60 The regulation component covers 
planning (goal setting), information management (organizing), 
monitoring (assessment of learning and strategy), debugging 
(strategies to correct errors), and evaluation (analysis of performance 
and strategy effectiveness).61 The survey was administered using 
standard procedures.62 
 
that the instrument was reliable, and was related with both the Learning Strategies Survey 
(LSS) and the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ). Sperling et al., supra 
note 56. Together these findings indicate that the MAI is reliable and valid. 
 58. Instead of using the four-point scale that Schraw and Dennison originally employed, 
we used a five-point Likert scale with alternatives: (0) never, (1) seldom, (2) sometimes, (3) 
often, and (4) always. Other than that modification, the instrument was presented in the same 
way as in Schraw and Dennison’s original study. In a personal email, Schraw reported that he 
now recommends using the five-point scale. Email from Gregory Schraw, Dir., UNLV Ctr. for 
Research, Evaluation, & Assessment, to Penée Stewart, Professor of Teacher Education, Weber 
State University, (Jan. 14, 2013, 12:38 PM MST) (on file with author). 
 59. Knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition are further separated into 
theoretical subscales. The subscales for knowledge about cognition are declarative knowledge, 
procedural knowledge, and conditional knowledge. The subscales for regulation of cognition 
consist of planning, information management, monitoring, debugging, and evaluation. 
However, Schraw and Dennison obtained support only for a two-component model of 
metacognition. Schraw & Dennison, supra note 23, at 470. Thus, the MAI should be regarded 
as a means to measure knowledge about cognition and regulation of cognition, not as a 
number of separate subcomponents of metacognition. 
 60. Sample items on knowledge of cognition are, “I am a good judge of how well I 
understand something,” and “I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.” Schraw 
& Dennison, supra note 23, at 473 Q5, Q32. 
 61. Sample items on regulation of cognition are, “I think about what I really need to 
learn before I begin a task,” and “I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a 
problem.” Schraw & Denison supra note 23, at 473 Q6, Q 11. 
 62. Researchers administered the survey instrument during class sessions in the three 
graduate programs. The survey was administered in paper form for business and education 
students and online for law students, but this distinction has no substantive content. 
Cooperation from the course instructors facilitated the administration and encouraged 
participation. All students were informed that the survey was voluntary, and some chose not to 
participate. 
For each respondent, three scores were generated and used in data analysis: scores for 
metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive regulation, and total MAI. Data from the survey 
instrument were analyzed using group membership as the independent variable and the three 
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B. Results 
After a brief explanation of how the data were analyzed, we will 
explain our results and conclusions. We report on three scales: MAI 
knowledge, MAI regulation, and combined. Table 2 in the Appendix 
presents the descriptive statistics for each group. 
In general, education students scored higher on metacognitive 
knowledge than the business and law students, but not 
significantly.63 Education students likewise scored higher in 
metacognitive regulation, and law students scored the lowest,64 with 
the differences being statistically significant as shown on Table 3 in 
the Appendix.65 To isolate the differences between the groups, a 
Tamhane (T2) post hoc test was performed (see Table 4 in the 
Appendix). This revealed that the significant difference in regulation 
and total scores was between the graduate students in education and 
students in the other two programs. Education graduate students’ 
mean scores were significantly higher than graduate business and law 
student mean scores, even accounting for differences in age. 
C. Analysis and Conclusions 
The results of this study may seem surprising initially. Although 
all of the participants in the study were successful undergraduate 
students, we wondered whether the BYU law students would 
demonstrate greater metacognitive skills given their academic 
credentials, and the relevance of metacognitive skills to the nature of 
their study and the profession of law. All three groups had similar 
metacognitive knowledge, but the BYU law students and Weber 
business students had significantly lower metacognitive regulation 
 
MAI scores (knowledge, regulation, and total score) as dependent variables in a one-way 
analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA). Alpha was set at 0.05 for all statistical tests. 
 63. Research suggests that by the time learners become adults, metacognitive 
knowledge is fairly well developed, while metacognitive regulation may be underdeveloped. It 
appears that metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation develop independently of 
each other. See Schraw, supra note 13, at 152. 
 64. The two cohort groups of law students were compared to ensure that they were of 
the same population and could be combined for analysis. There was no significant difference 
for metacognitive knowledge [F(1, 148)=.045, p=0.833], metacognitive regulation [F(1, 
148)=.923, p=0.338], or metacognitive total [F(1, 148)=.402, p=0.527]. 
 65. An ANCOVA was performed with group membership as the independent variable, 
scores as the dependent variable, and age as the covariate. Results indicate that there was no 
significant difference in scores for metacognitive knowledge. 
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scores than the Weber education graduate students. 
When statistically significant mean score differences are found, 
three possible explanations arise. First, the differences may be a result 
of sampling error (chance). This is an unlikely explanation in this 
study given the low probability values of the Analysis of Co-variance 
(ANCOVA). 
Second, there may be some threats to the internal validity of the 
study based on study design and procedures. There were differences 
in the characteristics of each program’s sample that may influence the 
results. For example, the law students were just beginning their first 
year of law school, while the graduate business and education 
students were at varying stages of program completion. In addition, 
the law students were younger and more homogeneous in age than 
the other participants. This may play a part in explaining differences 
in metacognitive regulation. The results of the ANCOVA showed 
significant differences between education students and the other 
participants when age was a covariate. Experience rather than age is 
the more likely explanation for the differences. 
The third and most likely explanation is that the data accurately 
reflect the true differences in performance between graduate 
education students and law and business students. In the next 
subpart we explore what may account for the lower performance of 
law students. 
D. Possible Explanations for Low Law Student Performance 
At first blush, it seems strange that law students with high 
entrance scores do not demonstrate metacognitive skills that are as 
well developed as graduate education students at a regional 
university. In this subpart we explore the likely explanations and 
what they mean for the development of legal education. The first 
clue may lie in the fact that the education students have honed the 
ability to teach new and struggling thinkers to think. Teachers 
develop metacognitive skills in the process of figuring out how to 
transfer the processes in their own heads to others. Secondly, the 
natural intelligence and talent of law students may have been enough 
to perform well in school so far without the boost generated by 
metacognitive skills. This assumption is supported by research on the  
 
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1070 
metacognitive skills of medical students, a population who also have 
done very well through undergraduate work.66  
The first explanation may lie in the nature of education as a 
discipline and the fact that the master’s degree education students in 
the comparative study have not only studied learning theory as 
undergraduates but also have had experience as teachers. Research 
suggests a relationship between metacognition and teaching 
experience.67 Teachers are trained to focus on the underlying core of 
learning and then design instruction to help their students do more 
capable thinking about the information presented. In this process, 
teachers naturally become aware of their own thinking. A prevalent, 
research-based instructional strategy in education is for teachers to 
use “think alouds” or cognitive modeling.68 In this process, the 
teacher is trained to become aware of the thinking used to complete 
a specific task and then make the thinking explicit to students by 
describing it as they perform the task. This may explain in part why 
education master’s degree students’ metacognitive regulation scores 
were significantly higher than the regulation scores of business 
students or law students. Although some of the law or business 
students in the study may have been trained as teachers, this would 
most likely be a relatively small percentage. 
In addition, all of the education students and most of the 
business students had work experience in their field of current study. 
The work experience of these two groups may be a factor in 
distinguishing their performance from that of law students. In 
addition to age, prior related work experience may facilitate 
developing metacognitive skills. Some of the law students worked 
following their undergraduate degree and before applying to law 
school, but most did not. Future studies need to run comparison 
groups based on prior work experience, age, undergraduate major, 
and other more specific demographics. 
 
 66. See supra note 54 and infra notes 73–76. 
 67. See Penée W. Stewart, Susan S. Cooper & Louise R. Moulding, Metacognitive 
Development in Professional Educators, 21 RESEARCHER 32 (2007). 
 68. See Cathy Collins Block & Susan E. Israel, The ABCs of Performing Highly Effective 
Think-Alouds, 58 THE READING TCHR. 154, 154 (2004); Dale H. Schunk, Self-Efficacy for 
Reading and Writing: Influence of Modeling, Goal Setting, and Self-Evaluation, 19 READING & 
WRITING Q.: OVERCOMING LEARNING DIFFICULTIES 159, 162–69 (2003); Jeffrey D. 
Wilhelm, Think-Alouds Boost Reading Comprehension, SCHOLASTIC INSTRUCTOR, Nov.–Dec. 
2001, at 26. 
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Another factor could be that many of the law students in this 
study may be sufficiently intellectually talented that undergraduate 
academic success came without truly honing their learning processes. 
Like athletes who have relied on their natural abilities through high 
school and college, they eventually come to the point where the 
rubber hits the road and they must learn to manage their talent to 
meet new competitive demands. Although the law students’ 
undergraduate grades were generally higher than the business and 
education students, it is easily possible that the more important 
factors were intelligence, time devoted to study, and motivation. 
Undergraduate students with well-developed metacognitive skills 
would perform better than their other abilities would predict; 
students with higher levels of talent, time, and motivation would 
score even better than they now do with well-developed 
metacognitive skills. 
Unfortunately, law school applicants who have received high 
undergraduate grades based on their diligence and raw intelligence 
may not have enough to rise to the top in law school, let alone in 
practice. Law students face competition unlike in their prior 
endeavors, and thinking like a lawyer requires something more. 
Highly qualified students have the natural talent, but their 
capabilities may not be realized without focused instructional 
intervention.69 A student with less talent but metacognitive skills 
could out-perform a student with more talent but no metacognitive 
skills; a student with natural talent and metacognition would be 
more capable of performing at the highest level. 
In a study of 179 undergraduate students, Savia Coutinho found 
a weak correlation between metacognition and GPA, meaning it is 
difficult to predict whether a student will have a high or low GPA 
solely based on their level of metacognition.70 Conversely, students 
who have both high natural intelligence ability and well-honed 
metacognitive skills performed much better than those students who 
have only high intelligence ability or only developed metacognitive 
skills.71 Metacognition enhances the academic performance for 
whatever ability level the student exhibits. Many of the law students 
 
 69. MARK QUIRK, INTUITION AND METACOGNITION IN MEDICAL EDUCATION: KEYS 
TO DEVELOPING EXPERTISE 132 (2006). 
 70. Coutinho, supra note 9, at 43. The MAI was used to measure the level of 
metacognition in this study. 
 71. Id. 
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1072 
in this study may have enjoyed sufficient academic performance as 
undergraduates without having to engage in metacognition 
regulation. The thinking demands of law and the highly competitive 
legal market will require focusing on a skill they have not honed in 
their prior education. 
Those who can readily adapt and figure out how to crank up the 
volume move ahead. Nancy Millich observed: 
Most law students have succeeded in their undergraduate 
careers because they have mastered traditional learning 
methods. They have developed the skills of memorization, 
note-taking, and review that are recommended by many texts 
dealing with how to succeed in law school. However, they 
have failed to understand that law school requires an 
additional layer of learning . . . [and] that “traditional study 
skills materials generally do not teach students to monitor 
and then change their learning and studying activities as the 
situation demands.”72 
The demands of legal education, where professors often push 
students out of their comfort zone, put more pressure on students’ 
natural learning styles to prepare students for the new thinking 
hurdles that will bombard them in the profession. 
Although no other research explores the metacognition of law 
students, the work with medical students, although limited, sheds 
some light on both of the possible explanations we discussed above. 
To begin with, medical students are more similar to law students in 
terms of innate ability and past academic achievement. Medical 
students are also not likely to have much in terms of training to 
understand their own or others’ thinking in the way that teachers do. 
Sevgi Turan and his co-researchers used the same instrument 
used in our study, the MAI, to examine the metacognition of 862 
medical students from four different medical schools, each of which 
used different curricular models.73 The results showed that many 
 
 72. Nancy Millich, Building Blocks of Analysis: Using Simple “Sesame Street Skills” and 
Sophisticated Educational Learning Theories in Teaching a Seminar in Legal Analysis and 
Writing, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1145 (1994) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Paul T. 
Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 ALB. L. REV. 471, 477 (1988) (citing Ann 
L. Brown & Annemarie Sullivan Palincsar, Inducing Strategic Learning from Texts by Means of 
Informed, Self-Control Training, 2 TOPICS IN LEARNING & LEARNING DISABILITIES 1, 3–4 
(1982))). 
 73. Turan et al., supra note 9, at 478. 
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medical students had low levels of metacognitive skills 
notwithstanding their academic achievement.74 In addition, Turan’s 
study showed links between higher metacognition regulation scores 
and the kind of reflective experience-based learning teachers have. 
The medical students from the one school using a problem-based 
curriculum—where students participated in various clinical settings 
and then discussed and reflected on what the experience taught 
them—had significantly higher MAI scores than the students 
attending the other schools.75 This finding is very significant, and 
studies of this sort need to be conducted with law students 
comparing various teaching approaches, especially the use of hands-
on clinics. 
It may also be that the prior work experience of education and 
business master’s degree students replicated this clinic-type 
approach, and law students who had not worked between college 
and law school were deprived of this advantage. Not all work 
experience would do so. It would need to be reflective and closely 
mentored. 
III. THE NEED FOR METACOGNITIVE SKILLS IN LAW 
Although more work needs to be done with larger samples, 
including more information about the subjects’ backgrounds and 
characteristics, our research demonstrates that law students, 
notwithstanding their prior academic achievements, may not have 
well-developed metacognitive regulation skills. The next questions to 
address are, first, whether metacognitive skills are truly needed in the 
law, and, second, whether such skills can be taught to those law 
students who are not yet proficient regulators of their thinking 
processes and strategies.  
As with law students, no studies have been published showing 
the level of metacognitive skills in practicing lawyers or comparing 
those skills between successful and less successful practitioners. The 
following section describes what education researchers have shown 
about metacognitive skills and then relates these skills to those 
needed in the practice of law. Just as with students, some lawyers 
may be limping along on their I.Q. or hard work. What is clear from 
this discussion, however, is that lawyers are particularly engaged in 
 
 74. Id. at 481. 
 75. Id. 
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the kind of work that is enhanced by high metacognitive skills. The 
educational psychology research discussed above supports the 
proposition that any student, any thinker at any level, can maximize 
his or her innate intellectual talent by developing metacognitive 
skills.76 In addition, an examination of the particular kinds of thinking 
demands that recur in law suggests that even the most intellectually 
qualified will profit from acute metacognitive regulation. 
To begin with, lawyers must continually improve in rhetoric, the 
manipulation of language, and the comprehension of long and dense 
texts. In this endeavor, comprehension, writing, attention, and 
memory are obviously invaluable. Metacognition enhances these 
abilities. The experts in educational science link metacognition 
especially with “oral communication of information, oral persuasion, 
oral comprehension, reading comprehension, writing, . . . attention, 
memory, [and] problem solving . . . .”77  
In addition to the ability to think, lawyers rely on other skills that 
are enhanced by a well-developed metacognitive awareness and 
regulation.78 Perhaps the most important is the ability to learn 
consistently how to think better when encountering each new legal 
problem. In addition, a lawyer needs excellent ability in oral 
communication and persuasion, reading and writing, fact gathering, 
and stress management. All of these are enhanced by high 
metacognition. Law is a profession centered on resolving complex 
disputes through competent advocacy. We will discuss each of these 
in the context of metacognition. 
A. Lifelong Learning 
Legal education requires some memorization, but the law is 
ambiguous, changing, and mutated by facts. Law professors have 
struggled in trying to explain that they are not “hiding the ball,” but 
instead that there is no ball. Moreover, law schools have long 
recognized that they cannot teach students in three years the 
doctrine, let alone the theory, for all the areas of law in which they 
 
 76. See supra Part I. 
 77. Flavell, supra note 7, at 907. 
 78. Id. at 906 (“[M]etacognition plays an important role in oral communication of 
information, oral persuasion, oral comprehension, reading comprehension, writing, language 
acquisition, attention, memory, problem solving, social cognition, and, various types of self-
control and self-instruction.”). 
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
1053 Teaching “Thinking Like a Lawyer” 
 1075 
may be asked to practice. And the doctrine in a particular area may 
change even before the student graduates by a legislative enactment 
or a dramatic change in policy by the Supreme Court. Thus, law 
schools must aim to teach students to “think like a lawyer,” so they 
leave armed to continually learn new law, new applications of the 
law, and creative new ways to make and use law. The thinking skills 
required to be a lawyer are articulated in a list compiled by Nancy 
Shultz: 
[L]awyers must be able to (1) analyze and synthesize legal 
principles; organize and present a coherent and persuasive 
line of reasoning in speech and writing; interview prospective 
clients, examine witnesses, and draft pleadings or 
interrogatories; listen, exercise judgment, and engage in 
moral reasoning; and develop knowledge of self and of the 
premises of the legal and the social order; (2) think 
independently, master complex bodies of data, organize the 
data into legal categories, and present the resulting 
intellectual product in a persuasive manner that is designed 
to achieve a particular goal; (3) critically analyze the utility, 
effectiveness, and social implications of legal doctrine and 
procedure; integrate nonlegal approaches into the legal 
problem-solving process; and synthesize and build original 
legal theories, frameworks, and systems; (4) figure out the 
different goals that a particular client might choose to 
pursue, sort out the relationships among different possible 
goals, devise possible strategies for realizing a particular goal, 
try to separate compatible from incompatible goals, and 
prioritize among different possible goals.79 
This list is daunting, but surprisingly true to what lawyers must 
do throughout their careers. Not included in this list is conquering 
every body of law raised by each client’s facts as applied in every 
jurisdiction in which the client does business or incurs liability. Each 
of these activities is a demanding intellectual endeavor. Law school 
cannot begin to give a student a formula that can solve all of these 
puzzles, let alone address the substantive law. Notwithstanding 
renewed enthusiasm in making skills courses available to students, 
law schools cannot hope even to teach students all the mental skills 
they need to excel. Therefore, today’s first-year student must 
 
 79. Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 60 
(1992) (citations omitted). 
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become a student over and over again to dig in and climb steep 
learning curves. Law is a thirty- or forty-year course of study. 
Professor Shultz concluded, “[p]erhaps the single most useful 
cognitive skill for a good lawyer is the ability to learn from 
experience.”80 
Learning how to learn each time faster, better, and with less 
stress is invaluable. Metacognition generates from every learning 
experience the awareness of how thinking happens and then, more 
importantly, the ability to strategize and control thinking in the 
next challenge. Thus, learning how to think better in the future is 
a metacognitive skill of infinite value to a lawyer. Teaching 
students to be these kinds of lifelong learners should be one of 
the “biggest components of legal education,”81 an idea taught by 
Anthony Niedwiecki in his work on teaching metacognition in 
legal research courses, outlined as follows: 
The discussion about how to teach law students often 
omits one of the biggest components of legal education: 
the best way to train students to be lifelong learners. 
Because law schools cannot teach students every area of 
the law or every skill they will use as lawyers, the focus 
should be on teaching them how to transfer their learning 
in law school to the novel situations they will face in the 
legal profession. . . . Lawyers need to learn new material on 
a daily basis, whether that material is a legal concept, a 
procedural rule, or a completely new discipline that is the 
underlying substance of a legal problem. Those who are able 
to learn efficiently and thoroughly are able to handle the 
constant learning required of lawyers, and learning theorists 
describe these individuals as expert learners.82 
The abilities that mark a lifelong “expert learner” strongly rely on 
metacognitive skills.83 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacognitive 
Skills of Law Students Through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques, 40 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 149, 153 (2012) [hereinafter Niedwiecki, Teaching]. 
 82. Id. at 153–54 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 83. Id. at 155 (citing Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to be Self-
Regulated Learners, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 447, 480 (2003)). Niedwiecki relies on the 
definition of “expert learner” offered by Peggy A. Ertmer & Timothy J. Newby, The Expert 
Learner: Strategic, Self-Regulated, and Reflective, 24 INSTRUCTIONAL SCI. 1, 1 (1996). They 
explain, among other things, “that an expert learner is a strategic, self-regulated, and reflective 
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B. Oral Communication 
Excellent oral comprehension and oral persuasion are perhaps 
more important in lawyering than in any other field. Litigators 
must explain the facts and legal arguments for a judge or a jury 
and respond quickly to the arguments and witnesses of the 
opposing parties. This requires the litigator to use metacognitive 
skills to quickly comprehend what he or she hears, process it, and 
find words to explain a response. Outside of a courtroom, a good 
lawyer must effectively explain the law and its application to a lay 
client while guiding the client toward finding solutions. In 
addition, much of any lawyer’s business consists of negotiating 
with opposing parties and their counsel. 
C. Hermeneutics and Drafting 
In addition to oral communication, a lawyer must work with 
complex texts. Metacognition enhances the ability to quickly 
comprehend, process, and apply language in texts.84 Lawyers write 
motions, court briefs, contracts, settlement agreements, demand 
letters, and a myriad of other documents. These must be precisely 
and persuasively worded. Even before entering legal practice, 
lawyers must complete reading assignments in law school that are 
extraordinarily long and demanding. While reading, a reader uses 
metacognition to monitor the complexity of the text, isolate 
difficult passages for rereading, and stop to make connections 
between different points within a text. The law student who can 
do this faster and better can overtake other students who may 
have higher intelligence. 
 
learner who uses different types of knowledge to bring about successful learning.” Niedwiecki, 
Teaching, supra note 81, at 154 n.30 (citing Ertmer & Newby, supra). Expert learners are also 
“self-directed and goal-oriented” and use knowledge in conjunction with effective cognitive 
strategies to enhance their opportunities to learn a wide array of information. Ertmer & 
Newby, supra. 
 84. See, e.g., Margaret G. McKeown & Isabel L. Beck, The Role of Metacognition in 
Understanding and Supporting Reading Comprehension, in HANDBOOK, supra note 39, at 7; 
Keith W. Thiede et al., Metacognitive Monitoring During and After Reading, in HANDBOOK, 
supra note 39, at 85. Both of these articles report on a wide variety of studies involving 
reading comprehension and metacognitive skills. See also Peter Dewitz, Legal Education: A 
Problem of Learning from Text, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 225, 229 (1997) (“This 
twofold nature of self-regulation, monitoring of comprehension and repair of comprehension 
breakdown, is called metacognition. Metacognition, or thinking about thinking, is critical to a 
reader’s success especially when reading challenging text.”). 
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These tasks continue after school: practicing lawyers do not 
simply read—they must detect and prioritize details. In practice, 
when reading documents from opposing counsel, interpreting 
statutes, and conducting research through prior judicial opinions 
and other sources of law, a lawyer must be able to quickly identify 
the kinds of small and subtle distinctions in facts and analysis that 
frequently wreak enormous consequences in legal results. 
D. Factual Analysis 
Metacognition may allow a lawyer to more efficiently gather 
accurate facts and better evaluate clients’ options.85 With each new 
problem, lawyers with high metacognitive skills improve their ability 
to strategize—to quickly identify what they already know, fill gaps in 
that knowledge, and predict how much time it will take to solve a 
problem.86 The use of metacognition in client interviews is described 
by John DiPippa and Martha Peters: 
In interviewing clients, lawyers must stay alert to their own 
mental patterns and ways they might distort clients’ 
information through their own biases and expectations. By 
accessing the metacognitive process one can monitor one’s 
own tendencies to prematurely diagnose clients’ issues, to 
come to conclusions about facts or legal options because they 
start to fall into a familiar pattern, and to stay alert to the 
ways one’s values may interpret a client’s story.87 
The ability to monitor and control thinking helps avoid distorted 
conclusions and mistakes in understanding and judgment. Having a 
more accurate view of the facts is a giant leap toward forming a 
persuasive argument. 
  
 
 85. John M. A. DiPippa & Martha M. Peters, The Lawyering Process: An Example of 
Metacognition at Its Best, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 311, 322 (2003). 
 86. Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 158. 
 87. DiPippa & Peters, supra note 85. 
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E. Anxiety Management 
Metacognition reduces stress and arms lawyers with greater 
confidence in their ability to tackle each new problem that enters the 
door. In Angela Legg and Lawrence Locker, Jr.’s study of math 
performance, students with higher metacognitive skills demonstrated 
fewer negative, anxiety-related mental processes.88 Although further 
research needs to be done to examine the relationship between these 
variables, Legg and Locker postulate that students with higher 
metacognitive skills may focus more of their mental energy on using 
productive “metacognitive processes to learn and think, rather than 
[focusing on] anxiety related thoughts.”89 This one benefit of 
metacognition training alone is sufficient to justify efforts to include 
it in legal education. 
Many students experience severe anxiety in law school. Practicing 
lawyers suffer more “alcoholism, divorce, suicide, and poor physical 
health” than the general public.90 While the exact statistics vary, 
some studies have found that attorneys are two to six times more 
likely than the general population to be depressed.91 The exact 
causes of these phenomena are unknown and may include a number 
of features of the profession and the kind of personality drawn to the 
profession.92 Nonetheless, in addition to whatever other causes, the 
 
 88. See Legg & Locker, supra note 36. 
 89. Id. at 480; see also Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 158–59 (“Those with 
strong metacognitive skills are better at these steps in the learning process and better at 
determining the appropriate legal action.”). 
 90. Rebecca LeAnne Bowman, When a Law Degree Is Not Enough: The Necessity of a 
Second Professional Degree for Lawyers, 14 (July 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Iowa), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1831&context=etd 
(citing Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, 
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874–80 (1999)); see also JEAN 
STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS 
CREATIVE MINDS 53–57 (2005); Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related 
Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & 
HEALTH 1, 45 (1995–1996). 
 91. Rebecca Stonawski, In Addition to the Law Degree, 21 EDUC. & L.J. 267, 274 
(2012) (citing Mark Hansen, The Less Final Option, 95 A.B.A. J. 35, 35 (2009). 
 92. See Stonawski, id., at 273, 282; see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A 
Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1337, 1416–21 (1997). According to information provided to CNN by the Centers for 
Disease Control, “[l]awyers ranked fourth when the proportion of suicides in that profession is 
compared to suicides in all other occupations in the study population.” Rosa Flores & Rose 
Marie Arce, Why Are Lawyers Killing Themselves? CNN U.S. (Jan. 20, 2014, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/19/us/lawyer-suicides/. 
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role of stress and anxiety cannot be overestimated. As one expert 
explained, if stress is chronic, “repeated challenges may demand 
repeated bursts of vigilance. At some point, this vigilance may 
become overgeneralized, leading an individual to conclude that he 
must always be on guard—even in the absence of the stress. And 
thus the realm of anxiety is entered.”93 One attorney described the 
“realm of anxiety” as feeling like “a coffee pot” that was continually 
“brewing in his stomach” and that each file on the desk was a 
“ticking time bomb about to go off.”94 This attorney admitted that 
as the anxiety grew, he became dysfunctional.95 Lawyers who know 
how to organize and regulate their thinking can move forward with 
confidence when facing not only complex legal problems, but also 
the debilitating dysfunction of depression. 
In short, the practice of law is particularly likely to include tasks 
that are enhanced by metacognitive skills. The best lawyers continue 
to be challenged by the work. They should be able to improve with 
each new case or transaction as they thoughtfully consider how they 
solved prior problems and how they can solve others in the future 
better and more efficiently. Lawyers’ trade and stock is words. 
Metacognitive skills improve oral communication, written 
communication, the deciphering of complex texts, and the ability to 
see the nuanced factual connections that help a lawyer build a case 
from a set of facts. Metacognitive thinkers develop patterns for 
approaching and unraveling thinking problems, which gives them 
confidence in new situations and helps relieve stress. These skills are 
particularly pertinent to the practice of law. 
IV. METACOGNITION IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND ATTEMPTS TO 
TEACH IT 
Given its importance, metacognition has garnered surprisingly 
limited specific attention in legal scholarship to date, and what does 
exist sometimes tends to confuse or blur the concept of 
metacognition. Although both the MacCrate and Carnegie Reports 
 
 93. Robert Sapolsky, Taming Stress: An Emerging Understanding of the Brain’s Stress 
Pathways Points Toward Treatments for Anxiety and Depression Beyond Valium and Prozac, 289 
SCI. AM. 86, 88 (2003). 
 94. Daniel T. Lukasik, How Stress and Anxiety Become Depression, LAWYERS WITH 
DEPRESSION (May 22, 2011), http://www.lawyerswithdepression.com/articles/how-stress-
and-anxiety-become-depression-2/. 
 95. Id. 
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raise issues embodied by metacognition,96 the only direct reference is 
in the Carnegie Report and is in passing: 
[P]rofessional schools cannot directly teach students to be 
competent in any and all situations; rather, the essential goal 
of professional schools must be to form practitioners who are 
aware of what it takes to become competent in their chosen 
domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and 
motivation to pursue genuine expertise. They must become 
‘metacognitive’ about their own learning, to use the 
psychologists’ term.97 
Moreover, metacognition training is directly included in the 
practices of only a few law schools.98 Those who have addressed 
metacognition in the context of legal education and lawyering, 
despite the differences in approach and proposed solutions, support 
the broad idea that metacognitive skills are critical for law students,99 
as well as for lawyers.100 In this section, we briefly review the extent 
of extant legal scholarship on metacognition and clarify some 
confusion and misuse of the term. 
 
 96. Schwartz, supra note 83, at 468 (“Although the MacCrate Report, perhaps the most 
influential work addressing law school teaching ever written, nowhere uses the terms ‘self-
regulated learning’ or ‘expert learning,’ it appears to have these concepts in mind in its 
reference to one of the skills new lawyers should possess, ‘organization and management of 
legal work.’”) (citing MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 140); see also Niedwiecki, Teaching, 
supra note 81, at 165–66 (discussing the Carnegie Report and other critiques of legal 
education in the context of the need for teaching metacognition). 
 97. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 173. 
 98. Boyle, supra note 27, at 13 (“Metacognition has received a modicum of attention in 
law teaching. Paul T. Wangerin advocated metacognition well over a decade ago, and a 
sprinkling of law professors have taken up the call.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating for the Transfer of Learning in 
Legal Education, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 51, 55 (2010) [hereinafter Kowalski, True North] 
(arguing that “metacognitive strategies . . . could help students bridge analytical skills from 
first-year legal writing to writing for clinic; doctrinal knowledge from classroom discussion in 
Constitutional Law to the final examination; and doctrinal knowledge from first-year Torts and 
Contracts to a tortious interference suit encountered five years later in practice”). 
 100. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone & Carmen Huertas-Noble, Lawyering at the Intersection of 
Mediation and Community Economic Development: Interweaving Inclusive Legal Problem 
Solving Skills in the Training of Effective Lawyers, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 157, 160 (2010) 
(“At the intersection of empowerment-driven mediation practice and [community economic 
development] lawyering is the central use of metacognitive self-awareness, robust information 
gathering, active listening, language reframing, facilitation, problem-solving, and consensus-
building skills.”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 153 (2010) (“Several avenues to 
help lawyers better calibrate their metacognitive judgments are advised.”). 
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1082 
In 1988, Paul T. Wangerin was the first to advocate teaching 
metacognitive skills to law students.101 Building on Wangerin’s 
suggestions, Nancy Millich provided concrete examples of fostering 
metacognition during legal writing courses.102 For the next decade, a 
handful of other scholars addressed Wangerin’s suggestion and the 
term “metacognition” was occasionally referenced in articles focused 
on other topics.103 
Although not focusing exclusively on metacognition, several 
articles in this era included some relevant discussion of self-regulated 
learning that typically included some sub-skills that are considered 
components of metacognition.104 While metacognition, self-
regulation, and self-regulated learning are technically different skills, 
many education scholars recognize that the meaning of these three 
terms “have been inextricably intertwined within the educational 
literature, either intentionally or unintentionally.”105 This problem is 
amplified in legal scholarship. 
The role of metacognition in developing the skills of lawyering 
has shown up more regularly since 2001, when Michael Schwartz 
included metacognition as a part of his call for learning theory and 
instructional design to be part of reform in legal education.106 The 
subsequent work, unfortunately, was plagued with confusion as legal 
 
 101. Wangerin, supra note 72, at 476–77 (1988) (“It is not enough for the student to be 
aware of his or her abilities and learning processes; the student must be able to monitor those 
studying activities during the learning process and be able to make appropriate adjustments.”). 
 102. Nancy Millich, supra, note 72, at 1145–48. 
 103. This scholarship is briefly described in Schwartz, supra note 83, at 468–71. 
 104. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 360 (1995) (“Just as there is a sound theoretical 
and empirical basis for requiring law students to engage in the active process of extracting the 
common patterns in appellate cases, there is an equally sound basis for requiring clinical 
students to keep and maintain journals reflecting on the initial experiences of practice.”); M.H. 
Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
139, 142 (2001) (“When students learn how they learn best, they engage in metacognition. 
Metacognition involves knowing how one learns and what results one achieves from different 
learning processes; it involves self-regulation of cognitive activities through monitoring and 
making appropriate adjustments.”); Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: The Emerging 
Role of Law School Academic Support Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 839, 852–83 (1997) 
(discussing learning process for performing tasks rather than observing and improving raw 
thinking). 
 105. Patricia A. Alexander, Why This and Why Now? Introduction to the Special Issue on 
Metacognition, Self-Regulation, and Self-Regulation Learning, 20 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 
369, 369 (2008). 
 106.  Schwartz, supra, note 83, at 349–51, 435 n.430. 
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scholars mistook metacognition as meaning reflection on the subjects 
learned rather than on the process of thinking as its own concern.107 
Metacognition received more targeted attention following 2010, 
although always in the realm of legal research courses. Paul Callister 
argued for the use of a long-held taxonomy of thinking skills, 
commonly referred to as “Bloom’s Taxonomy,” as revised by David 
Krathwohl, to guide the structure of legal research courses.108 
Krathwohl’s revision added metacognition as a new category in the 
taxonomy, defining it as “[k]nowledge about cognition in general as 
well as awareness of and knowledge about one’s own cognition.”109 
Metacognition, Callister contends, is essential to learning from 
mistakes and correcting them as a law student makes his or her way 
through the rigors of legal research.110 Callister identifies a specific 
competency within legal research that places metacognition as an 
essential skill for active construction of knowledge based on 
experience.111 This connection of metacognition to schema 
construction is unique, even for educational research and is one that 
should be further pursued. 
Callister suggests several types of tasks to build metacognition.112 
First, he recommends reiterative assignments that require self-
assessment of what is working and not working.113 Second, he 
suggests group presentations that are critiqued by peers.114 Note that 
this activity spurs metacognition only if peers ask questions that 
require self-assessment of the tasks involved. Third, he recommends 
reflection logs and diaries, which promote metacognition only if the 
students document the cognitive processes of their research and 
 
 107. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach, Note, Musings on Idea(l)s in the Ethical Regulation 
of Mediators: Honesty, Enforcement, and Education, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123, 158–
59 (2005) (“Time should also be allotted for the reflective portion of learning, which calls on 
metacognition to think and reflect upon the matters learned. Approaches that can be used in 
this regard include tools such as student journals or diaries, ‘coffee talk’ or small group 
discussions.”). 
 108. Paul D. Callister, Time to Blossom: An Inquiry into Bloom’s Taxonomy as a Hierarchy 
and Means for Teaching Legal Research Skills, LAW LIBR. J., Spring 2010, at 191. 
 109. David R. Krathwohl, A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy: An Overview, 41 THEORY 
INTO PRAC. 212, 214 (2002). See also S. Rajkumar, The Role of Metacognition in Learning and 
Teaching of Physics, SCH. SCI., Mar.–June 2010, at 48, 48. 
 110.  Callister supra note 108, at 210–11. 
 111.  Id. 
 112. Callister, supra note 108, at 217–18. 
 113. Id. at 217. 
 114. Id. 
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evaluate them for patterns of thinking behavior that were more or 
less successful.115 He concludes with asking a student to create a 
schema for understanding the research.116 These suggestions are 
similar to what education theorists have long considered 
metacognitive tasks. Unfortunately, Callister’s examples do not 
explicitly identify the critical attributes of the tasks that make them 
metacognitive and therefore he does not provide enough guidance 
for using them as metacognitive exercises. 
Adding to Callister’s work, Kristina Niedringhaus called for 
metacognition to be part of explicit instruction within legal research 
courses.117 In addition, she provided several examples of specific 
exercises to build metacognition: modeling, predicting outcomes, 
reflection, graphic organizers, and directed student teaching.118 
Unfortunately, while they all include active engagement of students 
in the learning process, some of these suggestions, such as graphic 
organizers and simple reflection, are not necessarily metacognitive 
and would not, by themselves, accomplish the goal of developing 
metacognition. Recording reflections in journals and blogs is 
metacognitive only if students use these resources to identify and 
reflect on their learning processes, and consequently re-direct such 
processes. Using journals and blogs simply to reflect on substantive 
content will not build metacognition.119 
After noting that guided and structured metacognitive reflection 
does not appear to be in wide use yet in law school training, Tonya 
Kowalski tied metacognition to the critical skill of “transferring” 
knowledge.120 Specifically, she described the apparent loss of skill in 
 
 115. Id. at 218. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Kristina L. Niedringhaus, Teaching Better Research Skills by Teaching Metacognitive 
Ability, 18 PERSP: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 113, 115–17 (2010) (discussing many 
ideas for implementing the teaching of metacognitive skills into a legal research and writing 
class, including self-questioning, predicting outcomes, forcing “thinking about thinking” 
through unfamiliar subject areas, and modeling). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 120. Tonya Kowalski, Toward a Pedagogy for Teaching Legal Writing in Law School 
Clinics, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 285, 288–91, 332 (2010) [hereinafter Kowalski, Toward]; 
Kowalski, True North, supra note 99, at 51–53, 64–65; see also Daniela Lucangeli, Doriana 
Galderisi & Cesare Cornoldi, Specific and General Transfer Effects Following Metamemory 
Training, 10 LEARNING DISABILITIES RES. & PRAC. 11 (1995) (reporting on a series of 
studies showing that metacognitive training increased the transfer or generalizability of 
knowledge from one context to another). 
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writing from first-year writing courses to clinical practice in the 
second and third years. She suggested steps to aid students in using 
acquired skills in later contexts, including asking students to 
“consciously connect their learning to experience in a process often 
referred to as metacognitive reflection.”121 In addition, she identified 
three exercises to foster metacognition: transfer exercises, private 
memos, and journals. 122 These reflective exercises engage 
metacognition when the students go beyond recording what 
happened or the content of what they learned and describe the 
strengths and weaknesses of their thinking process, take actions to 
correct errors or weaknesses, and propose solutions for improving 
their thinking processes. Elsewhere Kowalski clarifies that “deliberate 
effort” by students is critical to make reflection activities foster 
metacognition.123 If students underestimate the importance of 
metacognitive exercises, they “may tend to see these deceptively 
simple devices as mere ‘fluff.’”124 
Several of the teaching activities described are beneficial and 
good models for other law teachers. However, it is important to note 
that, in our descriptions of the activities suggested by Callister, 
Niedringhaus, and Kowalski, there is an “if” clause that must be 
included for the activities to be truly metacognitive and not just 
engaging instructional strategies. 
Anthony Niedwiecki has provided the best legal scholarship on 
metacognition to date.125 His 2012 article provides a useful 
explanation of metacognition’s role in legal learning and includes 
an excellent working definition of metacognition: 
Metacognition also can be described as the internal voice 
people hear when they are engaged in the learning 
process—the voice that will tell them what they have to do 
to accomplish a task, what they already know, what they do 
not know, how to match their previous learning to the new 
situation, when they do not understand what they are 
reading or learning, and how to evaluate their learning. It is 
 
 121. Kowalski, Toward, supra note 120, at 324. 
 122. Id. at 332–35. 
 123. Kowalski, True North, supra note 99, at 73–74. 
 124. Id. at 108. 
 125. See, e.g., Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 155; Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra 
note 10, at 45. 
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this internal reflection and conscious control of the learning 
process that goes to the heart of metacognition.126 
The principal focus of Niedwiecki’s work is aimed at teaching 
techniques for improving students’ metacognitive skills as part of 
the legal writing curriculum.127 Niedwiecki recommends student 
self-assessments as tools to develop metacognitive skills. The first 
self-assessment tool is implemented at the beginning of the course 
when the students articulate the thinking processes they bring to 
the class, “including their past learning experiences, their own skill 
set, their cognitive abilities and preferences, and which skills the 
course requires.”128 His second method is to require the students 
to use a self-assessment tool immediately after submitting an 
assignment, in which the students identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of their work.129 Once the professor’s critique of the 
assignment is returned, the students compare their self-assessment 
with the professor’s. Should the two assessments differ, the student 
must determine why they differ and evaluate the problems with 
their self-assessment.130 As students go through this self-assessment 
routine, they not only learn legal writing in the course, they also 
learn the skills needed to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses 
of their thinking in all their courses. 
Although Niedwiecki and others recognize the need for 
training students as self-regulated learners and are beginning to 
employ proper teaching methods, as of yet, few law schools teach 
metacognitive skills.131 Even when scholars argue for more 
metacognition training in law school education, they likely assume 
that law students, as previously successful students, already have 
fairly well-developed metacognitive skills and merely need more 
opportunities to “become more conscious metacognitive 
learners.”132 Some, including civil procedure professors Andrea 
 
 126. Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 156–57 (citation omitted). 
 127. Id. at 193. 
 128. Id. at 186. 
 129. Id. at 188. 
 130. Id. at 188–89. 
 131. Id. at 166. 
 132. Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, Beginning Legal Writers in Their Own 
Words: Why the First Weeks of Legal Writing Are So Tough and What We Can Do About It, 16 
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 223, 294–95 (2010). 
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Curcio, Gregory Jones, and Tanya Washington,133 assert this 
directly, making the incorrect leap that prior academic success 
means high metacognitive skills. For instance, “Because law 
students have been successful students in other areas, we can 
assume that they are likely already metacognitive learners.”134 
Niedwiecki’s experience, however, suggests the opposite: 
[S]tudents often come to law school with several 
metacognitive deficiencies. For example: 1) they don’t know 
when a task is easy or difficult; 2) they do not fully 
understand when they are confused or do not fully 
understand a particular concept; 3) they do not always know 
how long some task may take and what they need to do; 4) 
they do not monitor the success of what they are doing by 
determining when they have studied enough; 5) they do not 
always use all of the relevant information; 6) they often use 
step-by-step approaches without thinking about why they 
used the particular approach; and 7) they often jump to 
preliminary conclusions that guide their complete analysis, 
even when they ultimately turn out to be incorrect.135 
The results of our study substantiate his intuition on law student 
skills. We cannot assume that law students, no matter how successful 
in prior endeavors, have achieved, either inherently or through other 
training, the kind of metacognitive skills so essential to top 
performance in the profession they have chosen. 
V. WHAT IS NEXT: RESEARCH AND SOCRATIC METHOD 
Three important steps must be undertaken in the process of re-
creating legal education to account for the vast body of knowledge 
recently accumulated on metacognition. In this Part, we address the 
need for additional empirical work involving law students and 
practicing lawyers and the need for more scholarship on how to 
teach metacognitive skills, especially with respect to the use of 
Socratic Method. 
 
 133. Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones, & Tanya M. Washington, Does Practice 
Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam 
Performance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 280–81 (2008). 
 134. Felsenburg & Graham, supra note 132, at 295. 
 135. Niedwiecki, Lawyers, supra note 10, at 45. 
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Educational psychologists have called for researchers to “engage 
in more detailed study of how changes in metacognition, self-
regulation, and self-regulated learning affect educational outcomes” 
across the board.136 Further research may also reveal why students in 
various graduate disciplines perform differently in metacognition 
measurements. Because of the link between metacognition skills and 
the tasks required of law students and lawyers, further study of law 
students is warranted. Additional research needs to be done with 
more law student participants and across a wide variety of law 
schools, preferably over a multi-year period. Future research should 
determine whether there is a relationship between metacognitive 
abilities and the GPA earned during law school. It may be that low 
metacognitive abilities will correlate with a lower law school GPA 
and high metacognitive abilities will correlate with a higher law 
school GPA, even if high metacognitive skills are not evidenced by 
high undergraduate GPAs and test scores. If there is anything to the 
mantra of “thinking like a lawyer,” then metacognitive skills could be 
essential for the higher cognitive demands of law. It is also possible 
that legal education, even without any effort to address 
metacognition directly, results in some improvement in at least some 
metacognitive skills. 
In addition to seeking more data on law students, scholars need 
to widen the scope to study law graduates and practicing attorneys. 
A useful endeavor is research measuring the metacognitive abilities of 
successful attorneys and the uses of metacognitive skills in various 
kinds of practice. 
Research is also needed investigating the impact of deliberate 
instruction of metacognition in law school. The limited scholarly 
writing in law so far has discussed the development of metacognitive 
skills primarily in legal research and writing courses. Also useful 
would be a study of whether metacognitive skills are or can be 
effectively taught in substantive law courses. 
Of course, this work should explore the merits of Socratic 
Method. According to Professor Niedwiecki, traditional legal 
education, even at its finest, is insufficient to teach metacognitive 
skills. Although he acknowledges a link between metacognition and 
Socratic Method, he argues that Socratic Method “teaches 
 
 136. Dale H. Schunk, Metacognition, Self-Regulation, and Self-Regulated Learning: 
Research Recommendations, 20 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 463, 466 (2008). 
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metacognition implicitly and is only likely to help students who 
already have strong metacognitive strategies. For example, many 
professors simply do not explain the basis for the particular questions 
or the types of reasoning that they are asking the students [to] 
develop.”137 Other commentators on legal education are virulent in 
the dislike of Socratic Method but seem confused about what is the 
fault of the method and what is the fault of the particular professor 
and the natural pressures of a highly competitive and highly 
demanding environment.138 On the other hand, many education 
theorists have suggested positive associations between Socratic 
Method and teaching metacognition.139 This relationship warrants 
further exploration and suggests that reformation of legal education 
 
 137. Niedwiecki, Teaching, supra note 81, at 163 (citations omitted); Niedwiecki, 
Lawyers, supra note 10, at 34–35, 44–46. 
 138. See Cheryl B. Preston & Hilary Lawrence, UnProfessionalism and Bar Association 
Bashing, (forthcoming MICH. J. L. REFORM, 2015) (manuscript at 143–44) (on file with 
authors); see also, e.g., Andrea M. Alonso & Kevin G. Faley, The Law Firm Culture of Abuse, 
VT. B.J. & L. DIG., June 1999, at 38, 39 (1999) (asking whether the increased lack of civility 
has its “beginnings in the brutal Socratic method used by some law school professors”); David 
L. Baker, Should Law-School Applications Include a Warning Label?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1495, 
1506 (2011) (“If the professor is not civil in grilling a student under the Socratic method or 
providing feedback on a research paper, the aspiring lawyer learns incivility is appropriate 
behavior. Similarly, a professor who is unduly flippant or critical during class of a court’s 
decision reinforces an attitude of incivility.”); Catherine Therese Clarke, Missed Manners in 
Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 1023 (1991) (“[A]n awareness of expected 
standards of professionalism should exist at every level of law school training. Undoubtedly, 
the traditional socratic method [sic] would be ineffective in teaching the practical, professional 
skills of courtroom decorum.”); Paul T. Hayden, Applying Client-Lawyer Models in Legal 
Education, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 301, 303 (1997) (suggesting that Socratic Method teaches that 
a “super-competent lawyer is brusque, dominating, and often condescending to those less 
competent (a category that certainly includes clients).”); Jennifer Howard, Clinical Essay, 
Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Through Experience, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 167, 173–74 
(1995) (arguing that “the psychological impact of [the Socratic Method] simultaneously 
injures students and distorts their preparation for the interpersonal requirements of practice”); 
Kerr, supra note 2, at 115 (characterizing Socratic Method as “a weapon used to oppress 
students and eradicate independent thinking”); Michael Millemann, Symposium: 1997 W.M. 
Keck Foundation Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethic, The Institutional Barriers and 
Advantages Panel, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 496 (1998) (quoting panel member, Bruce 
Green) (“[T]he ‘Socratic method often is inconsistent’ with civility . . . .”); Michael Vitiello, 
Professor Kingsfield: The Most Misunderstood Character in Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
955, 956 (2004) (discussing claims that “the Socratic method in the hands of professors like 
Kingsfield . . . causes incivility between attorneys”); Gerald F. Uelmen, Symposium on Humor 
and the Law, 1992 BYU L. REV. 335, 343 (1992) (“The traditional Socratic technique, which 
is undoubtedly the least civil form of dialogue ever devised, will have to be discarded. The 
teacher will have to serve as a role model of gracious civility.”). 
 139. See supra note 4. 
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will not be successful if all that is added are skills courses and practice 
clinics. 
Legal educators grasping for the cornerstones of a law school 
experience for the twenty-first century should take notice of the 
work in medical schools. Mark Quirk, in his book Intuition and 
Metacognition in Medical Education, calls for a new paradigm of 
medical education to incorporate teaching metacognition: 
Ultimately, learning from experience requires 
metacognition—the ability to think about one’s thinking and 
feeling and to predict what others are thinking. 
Metacognition is a critical feature of the emerging paradigm 
for clinical learning that shifts the emphasis in medical 
education from application of knowledge learned in the 
classroom to preparing students to effectively practice 
medicine and learn from their experiences. It focuses on the 
learner’s ability to regulate experience with insight about self 
and the ability to monitor and control knowledge rather than 
be overwhelmed by it.140 
The same analysis applies to law schools. Although legal 
education has become more accepting of clinical and experiential 
learning, such pedagogy needs to be constructed with acute 
awareness of the need to inculcate metacognitive skills—the ability to 
continue learning faster and better from each future experience—and 
the role of substantive law courses. And, as in law, if the skill needed 
for practice is the ability to think, experiences in thinking (and review 
of how to think better next time) are essential. That may be the best 
and highest use of Socratic Method. Before we throw Socratic 
Method out with the bathwater, the relationship between it and 
learning metacognition must be more fully explored. 
In the preface to Quirk’s book on medical schools, the father of 
metacognition science, Flavell, acknowledges that medical students 
“are not your everyday, run-of-the-mill learners.”141 They have the 
 
 140. QUIRK, supra note 69, at 4. “The persistent popular view is that the expert 
‘becomes so from an overwhelming mastery of content-specific knowledge.’ On the contrary, 
it is proposed here that the expert becomes so from an overwhelming mastery of the skills 
required to continuously master content-specific knowledge. This marks a fundamental shift in 
our approach to medical education. . . . Although content mastery is still a critical outcome, 
metacognition and intuition—the processes of learning from and acting on experience—are 
the capabilities of medical expertise.” Id. at 11–12 (quoting Mark Graber, Metacognitive 
Training to Reduce Diagnostic Errors: Ready for Prime Time?, 78 ACAD. MED. 781 (2003)). 
 141. John Flavell, Preface to id., at xv, xvi. 
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intelligence, discipline, and drive necessary to do what it takes to be 
successful. “If [medical students are] really convinced that becoming 
more metacognitively sensitive and skilled would make them better 
physicians, it is hard to believe that these ‘superlearners’ could not 
and would not do so.”142 The same is true of law students. 
Underlying Quirk’s call to action is the clear assumption that medical 
students’ metacognition is underdeveloped, but, more importantly, it 
is reaffirming that metacognition is not natural in high-achieving 
undergraduate students and can be taught and learned. 
We challenge legal educators to recognize the apparent 
deficiency in student metacognitive skills illustrated by our study and 
incorporate curricula and other pedagogical techniques to help 
students develop this crucial skill. As students develop metacognitive 
skills, they not only gain the ability to become successful attorneys, 
but also to contribute to the success of the overall legal system and, 
with that, to the success of government and society. 
 
 142. Id. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Age and Gender by Group 
 Gender Age 
 Male Female Mean Standard Deviation 
Business 62 11 31.03 6.41 
Education 15 38 34.28 8.23 
Law 90 60 25.72 3.64 
 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for MAI Scores (Knowledge, Regulation and 
Total) by Group 
 
 Knowledge Regulation Total 
Program n Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Business 73 65.92 7.79 125.08 16.44 191.00 22.79 
Education 53 68.32 7.10 134.11 17.61 202.43 22.38 
Law 150 68.06 7.28 116.01 15.98 184.07 21.75 
 
  
02.PRESTON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2015 5:46 PM 
1053 Teaching “Thinking Like a Lawyer” 
 1093 
Table 3 
One-Way Analysis of Co-variance for MAI Scores (Knowledge, 
Regulation, and Total)  
  df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean Square F 
Knowledge     
Age 1 8.14 8.14 0.15 
Between Groups  2 252.08 126.04 2.28 
Within Groups 269 14871.58 55.29  
Regulation     
Age 1 1088.01 1088.01 4.08* 
Between Groups  2 6733.67 3366.83 12.63** 
Within Groups 269 71700.79 266.55  
Total Score     
Age 1 907.92 907.92 1.85 
Between Groups  2 7005.45 3502.73 7.13** 
Within Groups 269 132245.36 491.62  
* p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 4 
Tambane Post Hoc Analysis of Regulation and Total Score Mean 
Differences by Program 
  
Regulation Total 
Group (I) Group (J) 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
Error 
Business Education -9.031* 3.091 -11.434* 4.071 
 Law 11.794** 2.983 10.416* 4.279 
Education Business 9.031* 3.091 11.434* 4.071 
 Law 20.827** 3.323 
 
21.850** 
4.544 
Law Education -
20.827** 
3.323 
 -
21.850** 
4.544 
 Business -11.796* 2.983 -10.416* 4.279 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01 
